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CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS v. EDMOND: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DRUG
INTERDICTION CHECKPOINTS
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2001).
I. INTRODUCTION
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,' the Supreme Court ruled on
the constitutionality of a drug interdiction program operated in Indi-
anapolis. The Supreme Court held that the drug interdiction check-
points were unconstitutional violations of the Fourth Amendment be-
cause the primary purpose of the checkpoints was general crime
control.
This Note argues that the decision in Edmond was incorrect. The
previous roadblock cases of United States v. Martinez-Fuerte' and
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz' clearly established that
roadblocks in certain situations are constitutional, and the roadblocks
at issue in Indianapolis were not sufficiently distinguishable to war-
rant a contrary outcome. Had the Court followed the principles it set
forth in earlier roadblock cases, it would have been forced to uphold
the drug interdiction checkpoints as constitutional. Instead, the ma-
jority of the Court created an arbitrary distinction that has no basis in
prior case law or in the wording of the Fourth Amendment. As a re-
sult, current roadblock case law has become confusing and illogi-
cal-the Court solved nothing and despite its attempt to preserve in-
dividual liberties under the Fourth Amendment, the Court failed.
States can easily circumvent the Court's decision and establish road-
blocks identical to the roadblocks struck down in Edmond simply by
taking care to articulate a primary purpose that the Court has deemed
acceptable. As a result, the Court's promise to protect Fourth
Amendment rights is hollow and illusory. Increased litigation and
1 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
2 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
3 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
uncertainty about the types of roadblocks that are constitutional will
likely result.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... ."' The Supreme
Court has generally held that the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures requires a finding of indi-
vidualized suspicion or probable cause.5 However, over the years,
the Court has carved out several exceptions to this general rule, and
currently there are several limited situations where a search or seizure
can be reasonable under the Court's Fourth Amendment case law
even absent such individualized suspicion. These exceptions can be
grouped into two categories-the "special needs doctrine," where the
States pursue significant interests exceeding normal need for law en-
forcement,6 and administrative searches, where there is frequently no
individualized suspicion but the scope of the intrusion is correspond-
ingly limited.7
In Brown v. Texas, the Supreme Court addressed the reasonable-
ness of seizures under the Fourth Amendment in the absence of indi-
vidualized suspicion.8 In that case, two police officers cruising in a
patrol car in a high-crime area of El Paso observed defendant Brown
and another man in an alley.9 The officers did not suspect any mis-
conduct, but asked Brown to identify himself because he "looked
4 U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
5 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
6 See Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding random drug test-
ing of student athletes); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding
drug testing of U.S. Customs employees seeking promotion or transfer to specific positions);
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding drug and alcohol
testing for employees involved in train accidents).
7 See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-3 (1987) (upholding warrantless inspec-
tion of "closely regulated" business for administrative purposes); Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 509-12 (1978) (upholding administrative inspection of fire-damaged structure);
Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39 (1967) (up-
holding administrative inspection to ensure compliance with housing code).
8 443 U.S. 47, 48 (1979).
9 .,
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suspicious."' ' Brown refused, so the officers arrested him. He was
prosecuted for violation of a Texas statute requiring individuals to
identify themselves to the police when asked."' The Supreme Court
held that the officers violated Brown's Fourth Amendment rights
"because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe that
[he] was engaged in or had engaged in criminal conduct." 2
In addition, the Brown Court set forth certain principles regard-
ing searches or seizures conducted despite the lack of individualized
suspicion. 3 Such seizures, the Court argued, are not precluded by the
Fourth Amendment, but must be limited. 4 First, the "reasonableness
of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest ... depends
on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to
personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers."' 5
Factors to be considered in evaluating this balance include "the grav-
ity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which
the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the inter-
ference with individual liberty.' 6 The Court argued that the central
concern in this analysis is that individuals' reasonable expectations of
privacy are not subject to arbitrary invasions.'7 To that end, the Court
maintained, "[t]he Fourth Amendment requires ... that the seizure
must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral
limitations on the conduct of individual officers."'"
B. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ROADBLOCKS UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court first addressed standardized roadblock pro-
grams in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,9 where the Court re-
viewed criminal prosecutions resulting from the operation of border
patrol checkpoints near the border between the United States and
Mexico.2" The roadblocks consisted of fixed border patrol stations
10 Id. at 48-49.
I /d. at 49.
12 Id. at 53.
13 Jd. at 50.
14 Id.
'5 Id.
16 Id. at 51.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
20 Id. at 545.
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marked with clear signage on principal highways near the Mexican
border, and their purpose was to curb the importation of illegal aliens
into the United States from Mexico.2' At the checkpoints, approach-
ing motorists slowed to allow "point" agents to visually screen each
vehicle-"most motorists [were] allowed to resume their progress
without any oral inquiry or close visual examination," and only if the
"point" agent concluded that further inquiry was necessary would the
vehicle be detained for a longer duration.22 This checkpoint purpose
and its procedure were upheld as constitutional, primarily because of
the substantial federal interest in curbing the flow of illegal aliens and
the minimal intrusion the checkpoint imposed on passing motorists. 3
In evaluating the border checkpoints, the Court weighed individ-
ual Fourth Amendment interests and the public interests served by the
checkpoint program.24 The Court argued that the checkpoints were
designed to further an important and substantial public interest (limit-
ing the flow of illegal aliens into the United States), and the intrusion
upon individuals' Fourth Amendment rights was limited (the stops
were brief in duration and limited in scope).2" The Court recognized
that motorists knew or could determine in advance the location of
these fixed border checkpoints.26 In addition, the officers conducting
the checkpoints were not vested with limitless discretion; rather, they
were operating under strict guidelines in a regularized manner and
thus less able to engage in abusive, discriminatory, or harassing
stops. 27 These factors led the Court to conclude that the roadblocks
should be upheld.28
Shortly thereafter, the Court revisited the issue of detaining mo-
torists in Delaware v. Prouse.29 In that case, however, the Court was
not evaluating a checkpoint program. Rather, the Court reviewed the
detention of a single motorist driving on a public highway in Dela-
ware and sought to determine whether the stop of the motorist was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.3" Finding that the officer
21 Id.
22 Id. at 546.
23 Id. at 545, 551, 559.
24 Id. at 555.
25 Id. at 557.
26 Id. at 559.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 566.
29 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
30 Id. at 650.
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lacked any reasonable or articulable suspicion that the motorist he de-
tained was unlicensed or lacked vehicle registration, the Court held
that the stop at issue was unreasonable.3 To reach this conclusion,
the Court applied a balancing test, maintaining that "the permissibil-
ity of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests."32 The Court indi-
cated that this analysis should be conducted in light of an objective
standard such as probable cause.33
The Court recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in
ensuring that motorists are properly licensed and vehicles on the
roadway are properly registered.34 However, the Court argued that
discretionary spot checks, such as those conducted in Delaware, did
not contribute substantially to highway safety and therefore were not
justifiable intrusions under the Fourth Amendment.35 Such a program
of random and discretionary stops, the Court concluded, would result
in discovery of only an insignificant number of violators and was
thus too ineffective to qualify as a valid law enforcement practice un-
der the Fourth Amendment.36 In addition, the Court warned that a
program approving wide officer discretion in determining who should
be detained was likely to result in grave abuses of discretion.37 The
Court indicated, however, that its holding did not "preclude the State
of Delaware or other States from developing methods for spot checks
that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained
exercise of discretion. Questioning of all oncoming traffic at road-
block-type stops is one possible alternative."" The Court implied
that a roadblock established for the purpose of verifying licenses and
registration would be upheld as constitutional.39
The Court addressed the constitutionality of another kind of
roadblock-sobriety checkpoints-in Michigan Department of State
Police v. Sitz.4" The purpose of the roadblocks was to detect and
31 Id. at 663.
32 Id. at 654.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 658.
35 Id. at 659.
36 Id. at 660.
37 Id. at 662.
38 Id. at 663.
39 Id.
40 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
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eradicate drunk driving.4" According to the program guidelines, all
vehicles on the roadway would be briefly detained and motorists ex-
amined for signs of intoxication; if an officer believed a motorist was
intoxicated, the motorist would be detained for further sobriety test-
ing and for verification of license and registration." The average du-
ration of a stop was twenty-five seconds. 3 Because of the substan-
tial governmental interest in roadway safety and the minimal
intrusion the checkpoints posed on passing motorists, the Court up-
held the sobriety checkpoints as constitutional.44 The Court argued
that the Brown v. Texas balancing test should be applied in roadblock
cases. 5 First, the Court recognized the gravity and magnitude of the
drunk driving problem and the State's legitimate and substantial in-
terest in curbing drunk driving on its roadways.46 Then the Court in-
dicated that the checkpoint program imposed only a slight intrusion
on motorists-indistinguishable from the intrusion imposed on the
motorists at the roadblocks upheld in Martinez-Fuerte.47 The Court
evaluated the effectiveness of the program in addressing the State's
interests and determined that the 1.6% effectiveness rate of the sobri-
ety checkpoints was sufficient to justify their operation. 8 Thus, the
Court concluded, under the Brown v. Texas balancing test and the de-
cision in Martinez-Fuerte, the checkpoints should be upheld as
constitutional.'9
C. THE ROLE OF SUBJECTIVE INTENT
In two recent Supreme Court cases, the Court addressed the role
of officers' intent in Fourth Amendment analysis." In Whren v.
United States, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the tempo-
rary detention of a motorist whom officers had probable cause to be-
lieve had committed a traffic violation." The defendants in Whren
41 Id. at 447.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 448.
44 Id. at 455.
45 Id. at 450.
46 Id. at 45 1.
47 Id. at 451-53.
48 Id. at 455.
49 Id.
5o Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Whrcn v. United States, 517 U.S. 806
(1996).
51 517 U.S. at 808.
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were driving in a high-crime area and stopped at an intersection for
an unusually long duration when they noticed the officers' car.12
When the officers turned their car around to approach the defendants'
car, the defendants turned quickly and drove off at an unreasonable
speed. 3 The officers detained the vehicle and its occupants shortly
thereafter, and a search of the vehicle uncovered large amounts of
crack cocaine. 4 The Court held that the stop here was reasonable,
and the search was consistent with the Fourth Amendment prohibi-
tion against unreasonable searches and seizures. 5 The Court rea-
soned that prior cases "foreclose any argument that the constitutional
reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of
the individual officers involved."56 The Court explicitly stated that
"[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis."57 Thus, the defendants' contention that
the officers detained them for racist or discriminatory reasons failed,
because the officers could point to the traffic violations as reasons for
the stop, rendering their subjective state of mind irrelevant. 8
In Bond v. United States, the Court reviewed a conviction based
upon a search that occurred aboard a Greyhound bus. 9 At a border
patrol checkpoint, a law enforcement officer boarded a bus on which
the defendant was a passenger.6' As he visually inspected the bus and
its passengers, the officer felt the luggage in the overhead compart-
ments. Upon feeling the defendant's bag, the officer discovered a
hard, brick-like object that, after the defendant consented to a further
search, was determined to be methamphetamine 2 The Court held
that the officer's tactile search was an unconstitutional violation of
the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.63 The defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy when he placed his luggage in the
compartment directly above his seat, and a reasonable person would
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 808-09.
55 Id. at 819.
56 Id. at 813.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 529 U.S. 334, 335 (2000).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 336.
63 Id. at 339.
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not anticipate that his bag would be squeezed.64 In a footnote, the
Court addressed the role that the officer's state of mind should play in
the analysis, maintaining "that the subjective intent of the law en-
forcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that officer's
actions violate the Fourth Amendment.,
65
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. FACTS
In 1998, the City of Indianapolis developed a system of vehicle
checkpoints on city roadways designed to interdict illegal narcotics.66
Between August and November, six roadblocks were conducted.67
The authorities considered such factors as crime statistics and traffic
flow and accordingly selected the locations for the roadblocks weeks
in advance. 68 Generally, the checkpoints were conducted during day-
light hours and clearly marked by lighted signs reading
"NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT MILE AHEAD, NARCOTICS
K-9 IN USE, BE PREPARED TO STOP. 69 Officers had no discre-
tion to determine which cars would be stopped.7" Rather, every vehi-
cle traveling the roadway at that particular moment was briefly pulled
off of the roadway.7' A group of cars would be stopped, and the traf-
fic flow would continue until every car in that group had been proc-
essed.72
The procedure for the checkpoints was as follows: approximately
thirty officers were assigned to each checkpoint.73 The officers were
instructed to follow the written guidelines issued by the chief of po-
lice, which specified that an officer should approach each vehicle, no-
tify the driver the purpose of the checkpoint, and request to see the
driver's license and vehicle registration.74 The officer was also in-
structed to visually examine the driver for obvious signs of impair-
64 Id. at 338-39.
65 Id. at 338 n.2.
66 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34 (2000).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 35.
69 Id. at 35-36.
70 Id. at 35.
7 I d. at 36.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 35.
74 Id.
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ment, as well as conduct an open-view examination of the contents
of the vehicle.7" During this encounter between the officer and the
driver, a drug-sniffing dog would be walked around each vehicle.76
According to the officers' instructions, individualized suspicion had
to be established before any further investigation could occur.77
The plaintiffs, James Edmond and Joell Palmer, filed a lawsuit
on behalf of the class of all Indianapolis motorists after they were
stopped at the narcotics roadblock in September 1998.7" Edmond and
Palmer claimed that the roadblocks were a violation of their Fourth
Amendment rights and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as
well as damages.79
B. THE TRIAL COURT UPHELD THE DRUG CHECKPOINTS
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, find-
ing that the drug interdiction checkpoints did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.8" The district court applied the Brown v. Texas8 bal-
ancing test to determine the constitutionality of the checkpoints, 2
balancing "the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure,
the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the
severity of the interference with individual liberty." 3 In applying the
first prong of this test, the district court found that the city had a suf-
ficiently strong interest in preventing drug trafficking.84 As for the
second prong, the district court concluded that its role was not to de-
termine which methods the city should use to further the governmen-
tal interest in combating drug trafficking. 5 Rather, the court should
determine whether "the checkpoints are at least reasonably effective
as a tool for advancing the government's interest."86 Here, the district




78 Id. at 36.
79 Id.
80 Edmond v. Goldsmith, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1018 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
81 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
82 Edmond, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
83 Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.





ness ratio of other programs upheld by the Supreme Court.87 Finally,
in addressing the level of intrusion the checkpoints imposed upon the
motorists, the district court found that both the subjective and objec-
tive intrusiveness of the checkpoints were minimal.88 As a result, the
district court concluded that the checkpoints were constitutional.8 9
C. THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court
by a two to one margin.9" Chief Judge Posner, writing for the major-
ity, indicated that the city's primary purpose in establishing these
checkpoints was "to catch drug offenders in the hope of incapacitat-
ing them, and deterring others, by criminal prosecution."9' The road-
blocks had no regulatory purpose and were not geared towards guar-
anteeing roadway safety. 92
Posner argued that the general rule requiring individualized sus-
picion or probable cause before commencing a search and seizure is
only waived in certain limited circumstances. 3 Such instances in-
clude: (1) a search "where there is a suspect-the police have identi-
fied the criminal and have only to find him-but it is infeasible to
avoid an indiscriminate search or seizure of other persons not sus-
pected of a crime as well," (2) a search where "no specific person is
under suspicion but the circumstances make it impossible to prevent a
crime without an indiscriminate search," (3) a regulatory search, "the
objective of which is to protect a specific activity rather than to oper-
ate as an adjunct to general criminal law enforcement," and (4) a
search aimed at "the prevention of illegal importation whether of per-
sons... or of goods. 94 Posner concluded that the Indianapolis road-
blocks did not fall under any of these exceptions to the general rule
requiring individualized suspicion and, as a result, could not pass
constitutional muster.
95
87 Id. at 1023.
88 Id. at 1023-24.
89 Id. at 1027.
90 Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 666 (7th Cir. 1999).
91 Id. at 665.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 666.
95 Id.
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Judge Easterbrook dissented.96 Easterbrook criticized the major-
ity for focusing on the intent and purpose of the authorities in estab-
lishing the roadblock.97 Instead, he argued, analysis of the reason-
ableness of the search under the Fourth Amendment should be
objective and should depend "on what the police do, not on what they
want or think."98
Easterbrook then traced the reasoning in Martinez-Fuente99 and
Sitz, °° the two major cases in which the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of roadblocks. 1 First, Easterbrook argued, previous
roadblock cases generally recognized that drivers have a diminished
expectation of privacy relative to those individuals in their homes; the
majority ignored this fact.0 2 Second, the level of intrusion imposed
upon an individual's rights at a roadblock is minimal-the duration
of the stop is brief, and the scope of the search is very limited."3
Roadblock cases focused on these factors in determining the reason-
ableness of the search, not on the fact that roadblocks can be catego-
rized within the exceptions delineated by the majority opinion. °4
Third, the previous cases indicated that a "small invasion can be justi-
fied by aggregate success," and searches with a much lower probabil-
ity of success than that of the Indianapolis roadblocks have been up-
held as constitutional. 5 Finally, the Fourth Amendment clearly
prohibits standardless discretion of officers in deciding whom to stop,
but Indianapolis avoided this problem by setting forth strict guide-
lines curtailing officer discretion.'0 6 In summary, Easterbrook con-
cluded that application of the principles set forth in previous road-
block cases should lead to the conclusion that the roadblocks at
question in this case were constitutional.'0 7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1999 to determine
whether the City of Indianapolis's drug interdiction checkpoints were
96 Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 666-67 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
98 Id. at 667 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
99 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
100 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
'o' Edmond, 183 F.3d at 669 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
103 Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
104 Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
105 Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 670 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
107 Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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permissible under the Fourth Amendment."8
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Justice O'Connor 9 wrote the opinion of the Court, concluding
that the program of drug interdiction checkpoints established by the
City of Indianapolis violated the Fourth Amendment."'
O'Connor summarized the current state of the law about the rea-
sonableness of searches and seizures in general, and about roadblocks
in particular."' Under the Fourth Amendment, searches and seizures
must be reasonable and are generally deemed to be unreasonable
when the authorities conducting the search or seizure have failed to
establish individualized suspicion of wrongdoing."' O'Connor rec-
ognized that, in some limited situations, this usual rule does not ap-
ply."' Such situations include the presence of "special needs beyond
the normal need for law enforcement," administrative searches, and
roadblocks consisting of brief suspicionless searches to intercept ille-
gal aliens and to ensure the sobriety of motorists."4
O'Connor then reviewed the prior cases regarding the constitu-
tionality of roadblocks."' In Martinez-Fuerte, O'Connor indicated,
the Supreme Court found that the governmental interest in regulating
entrance to the country carried significant weight." 6 The roadblocks
at issue in Martinez-Fuerte, O'Connor explained, were near the
United States' border with Mexico and helped to further this impor-
tant governmental interest.' Subsequent cases, such as United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez,"8 have reiterated the importance of
regulating the border." 9 In Sitz, O'Connor maintained, the Supreme
108 528 U.S. 1153 (2000).
109 Justice O'Connor was joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer.
110 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).
". id. at 37-40.
12 id. at 37.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 37.
"1 Id. at 38-40.
116 Id. at 38.
117 Id.
118 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
119 Id. at 538; see also Edmond, 531 U.S. at 38.
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Court upheld sobriety checkpoints because of the "gravity of the
drunk driving problem and the magnitude of the State's interest in
getting drunk drivers off the road."'1
20
The Delaware v. Prouse decision, O'Connor posited, demon-
strated the Supreme Court's unwillingness to uphold a roadblock
with the primary aim of promoting the general interest in crime con-
trol.'2' The Supreme Court in Prouse indicated that a program de-
signed to limit officer discretion, yet aimed to achieve the purpose of
verifying license and registration, would likely be constitutional be-
cause of the state's strong interest in ensuring roadway safety and
preventing unauthorized drivers from populating the roadway.
122
O'Connor maintained that the Prouse Court was unwilling to recog-
nize the state's interest in preventing car theft as a justification for the
program because that holding would indicate a willingness to uphold
a program aimed at general crime control. 2 '
In Part III of the opinion, O'Connor applied her interpretation of
the current state of the law to the facts of this case.'24 According to
O'Connor, what distinguished the roadblocks in this case from the
roadblocks in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte is the primary purpose of the
roadblocks rather than the introduction of a narcotics detention
dog.' O'Connor indicated that several factors confirmed that the
primary purpose of the drug interdiction checkpoints was to interdict
illegal narcotics, such as the parties' stipulation, the instructions to
the Indianapolis officers, the signage marking the roadblocks, and the
conclusions of the lower courts.'26 O'Connor firmly maintained (and
repeated several times throughout the opinion) that a roadblock with
the primary purpose of general crime control simply cannot be up-
held. 127
O'Connor addressed in turn each of the City's five arguments
about why the drug interdiction checkpoints should be upheld as con-
stitutional.2 8 First, the City argued that the roadblocks upheld in Sitz
120 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 39 (citing Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451
(1990)).
"' Id. at 40.
22 Id. at 39-40 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-663 (1979)).
123 Id. at 40.
124 Id. at 40-48.
125 Id. at 40.
126 Id. at 40-41.
127 Id. at 42.
128 Id. at 42-43.
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and Martinez-Fuerte were both ultimately aimed at arresting those
who committed crimes (smuggling aliens in Martinez-Fuerte, drunk
driving in Sitz). 29 O'Connor agreed that the roadblocks in Martinez-
Fuerte and Sitz were in fact geared towards law-enforcement pur-
poses. 13 ° However, O'Connor argued that a line must be drawn, or
authorities could construct a roadblock for virtually any purpose
imaginable and point to some law enforcement purpose as justifica-
tion for the intrusion on civil liberties.1
3
'
O'Connor then discussed the City's argument that the "severe
and intractable nature of the city's drug problem" justified the drug
interdiction checkpoint program. 3 ' O'Connor recognized the sever-
ity of the drug problem but maintained that "the gravity of the threat
alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law
enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose."'3 3 In
analyzing the constitutionality of a search or seizure where individu-
alized suspicion is lacking, O'Connor argued, the Court should focus
on the connection between the law enforcement techniques employed
and the nature of the state interests those techniques are intended to
preserve or promote. 134 O'Connor again indicated that the Court is
unwilling to accept general crime control as a state interest sufficient
to justify an exception to the general rule requiring individualized
suspicion. "'
O'Connor next addressed the City's analogy between the road-
blocks in this case and the roadblocks upheld by the Court in Marti-
nez-Fuerte and Sitz.' 36 The City argued that the same roadway safety
concerns that justified the roadblocks in Sitz were present in this
case. ' O'Connor disagreed, because she reasoned Sitz related to a
much smaller class of offenses (i.e., drunk driving) that pose an "im-
mediate, vehicle-bound threat to life and limb."'38 In O'Connor's
opinion, the same concerns about public safety simply were not pre-
129 Id. at 42 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 22, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S.





134 Id. at 42-43.
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sent here, at least not to the same degree. 39 The City's argument that
the roadblocks here could be justified by an anti-contraband purpose,
similar to the anti-smuggling purpose upheld in the Martinez-Fuerte
roadblocks, was unconvincing to O'Connor as well. 4 ' Under that
logic, virtually any search and seizure at a roadblock would be justi-
fiable because of the chance that illegal contraband or other evidence
of a crime might be found. 41 While preventing drunk driving and il-
legal immigration are state interests that are sufficient to justify fore-
going the general rule requiring individualized suspicion, O'Connor
firmly maintained that a general interest in crime control, such as that
displayed by Indianapolis in employing these drug interdiction
checkpoints, is insufficient justification for abandoning a requirement
of individualized suspicion. 42  O'Connor stressed, however, the
Court's unwillingness to establish a bright-line rule differentiating
acceptable roadblocks from unconstitutional roadblocks or limit the
type of roadblocks considered constitutional."' Rather, the Court
was simply unwilling to categorize roadblocks aimed at general
crime control as constitutional.
1 44
The City argued that previous Supreme Court cases precluded an
inquiry into the purposes of the Indianapolis program.1 45  For in-
stance, the City contended that Whren v. United States and Bond v.
United States established the principle that "where the government
articulates and pursues a legitimate interest for a suspicionless stop,
courts should not look behind that interest to determine whether the
government's 'primary purpose' is valid." '146 O'Connor concluded
that those cases were not controlling.1 47 She argued that while Whren
found that the reasonableness of a search should not turn on the sub-
jective intentions of the officer conducting the search, the Court spe-
cifically distinguished cases where probable cause was lacking.148




142 Id. at 44.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 45; see also Brief for Petitioners at 34. (No. 99-1030) available at 2000 WL
1474135
146 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45 (citing Brief for Petitioners at 34) (No. 99-1030) available at
2000 WL 1474135
147 Id.
148 Id. (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810-13 (1996)).
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relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken
pursuant to a general scheme without individualized suspicion," and
Whren does not forbid an analysis of programmatic purpose here. 
49
O'Connor agreed that the situation in Bond was slightly differ-
ent.15 ° There, the Court did not engage in a typical Fourth Amend-
ment analysis because the search at issue was not based on probable
cause.'' Subjective intent in that situation was also irrelevant, but
only because the Court instead "focused on the objective effects of
the actions of an individual officer."' 52 O'Connor maintained, how-
ever, that where there is a general scheme authorizing intrusions on
Fourth Amendment rights without a requirement of individualized
suspicion, the Court should examine the programmatic purpose." 3
Finally, O'Connor addressed the City's argument that the secon-
dary purposes of the roadblocks (preventing drunk driving and check-
ing for licenses and registration) justified the City's use of the road-
blocks.'54 She quickly discounted the argument, suggesting that if
authorities could justify their seizures by pointing to secondary pur-
poses, "checkpoints for virtually any purpose [would be constitu-
tional] so long as they included a license or sobriety check."'55
Rather, she maintained, the Court should look beyond a typical
analysis focused on the reasonableness of a search and determine the
primary purpose of a general scheme in analyzing its constitutional-
ity.156 O'Connor admitted that a purpose inquiry is often challenging,
but indicated that it is a routine inquiry in the constitutional arena to
prevent governmental abuses.5 7 So, while a Fourth Amendment
claim typically warrants an objective reasonableness inquiry, previ-
ous special needs cases and administrative cases have indicated that
purpose is often relevant, particularly in situations where there are
suspicionless intrusions authorized by a general scheme.'58
O'Connor concluded by stressing the limits of the Court's opin-
149 Id. at 45-46.




154 Id. at 46-47.
I55 d.at 46.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 46-47.
158 Id. at 47.
[Vol. 93
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS v. EDMOND
ion. "'59 She maintained that the Court's holding in no way impacts the
earlier holdings in Martinez-Fuerte, Sitz, and Prouse-"[t]he consti-
tutionality of such checkpoint programs still depends on a balancing
of the competing interests at stake and the effectiveness of the pro-
gram."' 6 ° In addition, O'Connor recognized that the Court's holding
should not affect searches in other situations where there is a great
need for public safety or a strong federal regulatory interest, such as
border searches or searches in government buildings and airports.' 6'
O'Connor indicated that the holding here also should not affect situa-
tions where officers act upon information discovered at a lawful
checkpoint program.'62 O'Connor then cautioned that the primary
purpose test the Court engaged in should only occur when the Court
is evaluating a general scheme on the programmatic level and is cer-
tainly "not an invitation to probe the minds of individual officers act-
ing at the scene."'
163
O'Connor again stated the holding of the Court-"[b]ecause the
primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint program is ultimately
indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the
checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment"-and affirmed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 164
B. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S DISSENT' 65
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that the roadblocks
should be found constitutional.' 66 Rehnquist maintained that because
the Indianapolis roadblocks served important state interests, they
should have been upheld as constitutional under the Fourth Amend-
ment. 67 Also, adding a narcotics detection dog did not alter in any
way the nature of the search and did not make the searches here dis-
tinguishable from searches and seizures upheld in previous cases,
requiring that the roadblocks be found constitutional under the Fourth
"' Id. at 47-48.
160 Id. at 47 (citing Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450-55 (1990);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-64 (1976)).
161 Id. at 47-48.
162 Id. at 48.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent.
166 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).




In Part I of his dissent, Rehnquist advocated an application of the
Brown v. Texas balancing test to the facts of this case. 6 9 Roadblock
seizure analysis, Rehnquist argued, turns upon "a weighing of the
gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to
which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the
interference with individual liberty."' 7 ° Accordingly, he maintained,
"roadblock seizures are consistent with the Fourth Amendment if
they are 'carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral
limitations on the conduct of individual officers.""
'171
The Brown v. Texas balancing test was applied in Martinez-
Fuerte, and as Rehnquist explained, the significant governmental in-
terest in curbing illegal immigration outweighed the minimal intru-
sion imposed upon motorists at the border checkpoints.7 7 Rehnquist
turned to Sitz, where the Court found that the state had a great interest
in preventing drunk driving, and the roadblocks it used to further this
goal imposed only a "slight" intrusion on motorists. 73 Rehnquist ar-
gued that "this case follows naturally from Martinez-Fuerte and
Sitz."'
174
Further, he disagreed with the majority's contention that analysis
of the constitutionality of the roadblocks should focus on the road-
blocks' primary purpose.'75 Rehnquist pointed to the record, which
indicated that forty-nine people were arrested in Indianapolis for of-
fenses unrelated to drugs.'76 This fact, he argued, indicated that the
City was pursuing a legitimate state interest by conducting a road-
block that served several purposes-intercepting drivers that display
signs of impairment (an endeavor upheld by Sitz), as well as verifying
licenses and vehicle registrations (a purpose legitimized by
Prouse).'77 In addition, he maintained that it would be entirely specu-
lative to conclude from the record that the City of Indianapolis would
168 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 49. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
170 Id. (Rehnquist, CI., dissenting) (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979)).
I71 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Brown, 443 U.S. at 51).
172 Id. (Rehnquist, CI., dissenting).
173 Id. at 50 (Rehnquist, C., dissenting).
174 Id. (Rehnquist, CI., dissenting).
175 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659,
661 (7th Cir. 1999)).
'77 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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not have operated the roadblocks but for the drug interdiction pur-
pose-clearly, the City achieved success pursuing other goals
through these roadblocks, as evidenced by the forty-nine non-drug-
related arrests.178
Rehnquist then argued that inquiry into the officers' subjective
intent was improper here--"[b]ecause of the valid reasons for con-
ducting these roadblock seizures, it is constitutionally irrelevant that
petitioners also hoped to interdict drugs."'79 Whren precluded such
an inquiry, Rehnquist maintained, and instead stood for the proposi-
tion that determining the reasonableness of an individual officer's de-
cision to stop a vehicle depends upon the officer's determination of
probable cause. 8 ' In this case, Rehnquist argued, reasonableness de-
pended upon whether the roadblocks "effectively serve a significant
state interest with minimal intrusion on motorists."'' The Indianapo-
lis roadblocks were objectively reasonable because they serve the
significant state interests of preventing drunk driving and verifying
motorists' licenses and vehicle registration, while imposing only
minimal intrusion on the drivers who are stopped.' Rehnquist
firmly maintained that "it is the objective effect of the State's actions
on the privacy of the individual that animates the Fourth Amend-
ment."' 83 The state of mind or subjective intent of the officer should
play no role in light of Bond and Whren.'84
Once it has been established that the roadblocks in Indianapolis
serve significant state interests, Rehnquist continued, the other "two
prongs of the Brown v. Texas balancing test are easily met."' 85 The
case is only distinguishable from Sitz because of the introduction of a
narcotics detection dog.'86 Previous cases have held that "a 'sniff
test' by a trained narcotics dog is not a 'search' within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment because it does not require the physical intru-
sion beyond being sniffed, and it does not expose anything other than
the contraband items."' 87 Finally, Rehnquist argued that the success
178 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
179 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
180 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
181 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
18' Id. at 51-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
183 Id. at 52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
184 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
185 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
186 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
187 I. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
87Id. at 52-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
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rate of the Indianapolis roadblock program confirmed that the City
was pursuing legitimate and pressing interests (preventing drunk
driving and verifying licenses and registrations) in conducting the
program."' s In sum, because "these stops effectively serve the State's
legitimate interests; they are executed in a regularized and neutral
manner; and they only minimally intrude upon the privacy of the mo-
torists," Rehnquist believed they should have been upheld as consti-
tutional. "'
Rehnquist devoted Part II of his dissent to criticizing the major-
ity's holding."9 ° According to Rehnquist, the majority had adopted a
"non-law enforcement primary purpose test," lifting the test from a
separate area of Fourth Amendment case law regarding searches of
homes and businesses.19' In fact, he argued, the question the Court
chose to answer was not a question posed in this case, and the adop-
tion of a non-law enforcement primary purpose test is poorly suited
for cases involving roadblocks, because, in that area, the Court has
traditionally assessed the scope of the intrusion to determine constitu-
tionality.'92 In Sitz, Rehnquist maintained, the Court explicitly de-
clined to apply this sort of primary purpose test, instead applying the
balancing test of Brown v. Texas.'93
Rehnquist then discussed the "special needs doctrine"-an ex-
ception to the general rule requiring individualized suspicion to con-
duct a search.' 94 The doctrine is inapplicable in all roadblock cases,
he argued, because it only refers to situations involving persons' bod-
ies or homes, where there is a high expectation of privacy. 95 Auto-
mobiles, he maintained, are not subject to this kind of privacy expec-
tation because individuals clearly have a lowered privacy expectation
in their vehicles.' 96 Therefore, Rehnquist posited, the "special needs
doctrine" should only be used to evaluate the reasonableness of
searches of homes or persons, whereas the Brown v. Texas balancing
706-07 (1983)).
188 Id. at 53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
189 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
190 Id. at 53-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
192 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).193 Id. at 53-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
94 Id. at 54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
195 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 561 (1976).
196 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 54-55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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test is clearly and decidedly the appropriate evaluative tool to be used
in roadblock cases.197 Rehnquist maintained the primary purpose test
the majority adopted is "both unnecessary to secure Fourth Amend-
ment rights and bound to produce wide-ranging litigation over the
'purpose' of any given seizure." '198 The majority opinion is illogical
because the City of Indianapolis could have articulated a different
purpose for these roadblocks but conducted the roadblocks in the ex-
act same manner, and such a program would have been constitutional
under the majority's analysis.199
In sum, Rehnquist concluded that the majority's articulation of a
new test was unnecessary and failed to serve any Fourth Amendment
concerns."' ° Considerations of stare decisis should have required up-
holding the roadblocks at issue here.2"'
C. JUSTICE THOMAS' DISSENT
Justice Thomas argued that the previous roadblock cases of Mar-
tinez-Fuerte and Sitz "stand for the proposition that suspicionless
roadblock seizures are constitutionally permissible if conducted ac-
cording to a plan that limits the discretion of the officers conducting
the stops."2  Although he believed that Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz
might have been incorrectly decided and that the framers of the Con-
stitution would most likely not have considered the seizures at issue
here reasonable, he was propelled by considerations of stare de-
cisis.23 As a result, and for the reasons articulated in Rehnquist's
dissent, Thomas refrained from joining in the majority opinion. 20 4
V. ANALYSIS
Under the Fourth Amendment, "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... 2o Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has indicated that reasonableness of
searches and seizures may hinge upon the existence of probable
197 Id. at 55 (Rehnquist, C.., dissenting).
198 Id. (Rehnquist, C., dissenting).
199 Id. at 55-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
201 Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
202  d. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
203 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
204 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
205 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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cause, although the Court has recognized instances where authorities
are exempt from the probable cause requirement." 6 In addition, the
Court has upheld some limited searches and seizures when the grav-
ity and importance of the public interest served outweighs the intru-
sion imposed on individuals."0 7
In light of previous roadblock cases, the Court here should have
upheld the Indianapolis checkpoints as a valid exercise of govern-
mental power. Instead, the Court ignored the Brown v. Texas balanc-
ing test previously applied in roadblock cases and introduced an
analysis focused on the primary purpose of the checkpoint pro-
gram. 0 8 This new analysis demonstrates a shift in established Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, and, despite the Court's articulated effort
to protect Fourth Amendment rights, its new approach affords little
protection of individual liberties. Instead, the Court complicated
search and seizure analysis, drawing an arbitrary and meaningless
distinction and inviting extensive inquiry into subjective intent of leg-
islatures. Because the Court's decision can be easily circumvented
by legislatures who carefully draft the guidelines and purpose state-
ments for checkpoint programs, the Court's promise of increased
Fourth Amendment protection is illusory and hollow. The Court
should have followed its own roadblock precedents and applied the
Brown v. Texas balancing test as required by Sitz. Had it done so, the
Indianapolis checkpoint program would have been upheld. Although
this outcome may have meant a greater degree of intrusion on motor-
ists' liberty, such an intrusion is justifiable in light of the govern-
ment's great interest in promoting roadway safety and curbing the
rampant drug trade.
A. THE INDIANAPOLIS CHECKPOINTS DID NOT MATERIALLY DIFFER
FROM THE CHECKPOINTS THE COURT UPHELD IN MARTINEZ-
FUERTE AND SITZ
In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court found that the state interest in
preventing the illegal smuggling of aliens from Mexico into the
United States justified the use of fixed roadblocks near the border. 0 9
In Delaware v. Prouse, the Court suggested that the state interest in
206 See discussion of the "special needs doctrine" and administrative searches exemption,
supra Section II(A); supra notes 7 and 8.
207 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
208 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42.
209 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 522, 556, 566 (1976).
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preventing unlicensed drivers from driving on public roadways would
warrant the use of a roadblock to verify licenses and vehicle registra-
tions.2 In Sitz, the Court deemed that Michigan's interest in eradi-
cating drunk driving justified the use of sobriety checkpoints.
The City of Indianapolis attempted to create a checkpoint pro-
gram designed to address several of these same state interests. As the
record indicates, the City had three purposes in establishing the
checkpoints-first, to prevent illegal narcotics trafficking (which the
City admits is its primary purpose), second, to check for signs of im-
pairment and thus promote roadway safety, and third, to check for li-
212censes and registrations. To that end, the checkpoints in Indian-
apolis were operated in much the same way the Court suggested in
Delaware v. Prouse-all vehicles were stopped, and an officer re-
quested each driver's license and registration while searching for
signs of impairment (as authorized in Sitz).2"3
The only difference between the procedures followed in check-
points previously approved by the Court and the procedure followed
in the instant case was the introduction of the narcotics detection dog,
which sniffed the perimeter of the vehicle while the officer checked
for licenses and registration and conducted a plain view examination
of the vehicle.214 As Rehnquist indicated in his dissent, the Court
held in United States v. Place"5 that a sniff test by a narcotics detec-
tion dog is not necessarily a search within the constraints of the
Fourth Amendment, "because it does not require physical intrusion of
the object being sniffed and it does not expose anything other than
the contraband items. 21 6 In addition, the sniff test does not lengthen
the duration of the stop. 2 7 The majority of the Court, too, recognized
that a "sniff by a dog that simply walks around a car is 'much less in-
trusive than a typical search,"' because "an exterior sniff of an auto-
mobile does not require entry into the car and is not designed to dis-
close any information other than the presence or absence of
210 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
211 Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
212 Oral Argument, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (No. 99-1030)
available at 2000 WL 1474135.
213 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663.
214 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35.
215 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that exposure of a trav-
eler's luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog is not a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes).
216 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 52-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).




In sum, Indianapolis implemented a roadblock program modeled
after roadblock programs previously upheld by the Court-officers
had strictly limited discretion and followed clear procedures, and the
state acted in pursuit of its interest in preventing drug trafficking in
addition to interests previously recognized as legitimate by the Court.
The line the Court draws here between sobriety checkpoints and drug
interdiction checkpoints has no basis in the case law, for in its opin-
ion, the Sitz Court did not indicate that the Brown v. Texas balancing
test should only apply when certain, defined state interests were be-
ing pursued.2"9 Rather, the Sitz Court made a blanket determination
that in the evaluation of roadblocks, Brown v. Texas is controlling.2 °
Even opponents of the Sitz decision posited prior to the Edmond case
that drug interdiction checkpoints followed naturally from the Court's
decision in that case.221
B. BECAUSE THE CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS DID NOT DEVIATE FROM
THE PURPOSE OR PROCEDURE OF THE CHECKPOINTS UPHELD IN
MARTINEZ-FUERTE AND SITZ, THE COURT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED
THE BROWN V. TEXAS BALANCING TEST
Had the Court followed its own roadblock precedents, it would
have applied the Brown v. Texas balancing test to evaluate the consti-
tutionality of the roadblocks.222 The Court here did not address the
Brown v. Texas balancing test-nowhere in the opinion is it even
mentioned, and no reason is articulated for that omission.
Although Brown did not involve a challenge to a roadblock de-
tainment, the Brown Court did not narrow its holding to apply only to
the facts of the arrest; instead, the Brown Court maintained that a bal-
ancing test is appropriate in evaluating the "reasonableness of sei-
zures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest." ' The road-
blocks in Indianapolis are undoubtedly considered seizures under the
Fourth Amendment, 24 but the brief duration of a typical stop at the
checkpoint (between three and five minutes) and the limited scope of
218 Id. at 40.
219 Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990).
220 Id.
221 Sandra Guerra, Domestic Drug Interdiction Operations: Finding the Balance, 82 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1137 (1992).
222 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450.
223 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979).
224 United States v. Martinez-Fuertc, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).
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the intrusion (a plain-view examination of driver and vehicle, a re-
quest for license and registration, and a brief sniff test by a narcotics
detection dog)225 render it a seizure undoubtedly less intrusive than a
traditional arrest. If an officer had no reason to suspect a motorist of
wrongdoing, the motorist would be released and on his way within
minutes. 226  The Court here should have applied this test, for the
Court did not clearly distinguish the roadblocks at issue here from the
roadblocks that had previously been upheld. Under the Brown v.
Texas test, the drug interdiction checkpoints would have been upheld
as consistent with the Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonable-
ness.
First, the City of Indianapolis would have to show that the road-
blocks were designed to address a grave public concern. 227  Courts
have repeatedly recognized the extensive nature of the drug problem
in this country. The Supreme Court referred to the situation as a
"veritable national crisis in law enforcement ' 22 and "one of the
greatest problems affecting the health and welfare of our popula-
tion. '  As noted by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Mendenhall, "[t]he public has a compelling interest in detecting those
who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit., 23" The Su-
preme Court also noted the importance of this state interest in United
States v. Place, where the Court upheld the seizure of the luggage of
a traveler suspected of transporting illegal narcotics and the exposure
of the traveler's luggage to a sniff by a narcotics detection dog.23  In
addition, lower federal courts and state courts have upheld drug in-
terdiction checkpoints similar to the checkpoints in Indianapolis, not-
ing the gravity of the public interest served.232
225 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000).
226 Id.
227 Brown, 443 U.S. at 5 1.
228 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
229 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989).
230 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 561 (1980).
231 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
232 See Merret v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1553 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (upholding constitutional-
ity of a mixed-motive checkpoint, where officers verifying licenses and registration also use
canines to detect illegal narcotics); Missouri v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 575 (Mo. 1996)
(upholding checkpoints established solely to detect illegal narcotics, finding that the check-
points advanced an important state interest and imposed minimal intrusion on motorists); but
see United States v. Huguenin, 154 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding drug interdiction
checkpoints to be unconstitutional violations of the Fourth Amendment because the gravity
of the public concern does not outweigh the degree of intrusion imposed on motorists);
United States v. Morales Zamora, 974 F.2d 149, 153 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that subject-
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The City of Indianapolis had a significant interest in interdicting
illegal narcotics and preventing the drug trafficking trade from
spreading within the city. The other purposes the city articulated in
conducting the roadblocks already have been upheld as valid state in-
terests warranting a roadblock stop: the Sitz Court upheld sobriety
checkpoints233 and the Prouse Court implied that roadblocks for the
purpose of verifying license and registration would pass constitu-
tional muster.234
Next, the City would have to show that the methods it used were
effective in addressing the public interests.235 The record indicated
that during the six roadblocks the city conducted, 1161 vehicles were
stopped and 104 motorists were arrested; fifty-five arrests were for
drug-related offenses, and forty-nine were related to other of-
fenses.236 The total hit rate for the program, therefore, was approxi-
mately nine percent:237 4.7% of the stops resulted in arrests for drug
offenses, and 4.2% resulted in arrests for other offenses. This effec-
tiveness ratio is substantially higher than the effectiveness ratio of
other roadblocks that were upheld. In Sitz, the Court found that the
sobriety checkpoints challenged in Michigan resulted in arrest about
1.6% of the time; an expert testified that sobriety checkpoints gener-
ally have a one percent hit rate.238 In Martinez-Fuerte, the record
showed that illegal aliens were found in only 0.12% of all vehicles
and in about 0.5% of detained vehicles.239 In both of these instances,
the checkpoints were upheld. Here, the checkpoints are significantly
more effective in detecting violators and thus furthering the govern-
mental interest. The Indianapolis roadblock should not be struck
down on the basis of this factor of the Brown v. Texas balancing test.
Finally, the City would have to show that the intrusion the drug
interdiction checkpoints imposed upon passing motorists was not so
ing a vehicle to a canine sniff at a roadblock whose primary purpose was to verify licenses
and registration an unconstitutional pretextual search in violation of the Fourth Amendment);
Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (maintaining that the
state's interest in deterring drug trafficking is insufficient to justify the Fourth Amendment
intrusion posed by a drug interdiction roadblock).
233 Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
234 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979).
235 Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
236 Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 1999).
237 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000).
238 Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
239 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976).
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severe as to outweigh the public interest.24" As previously discussed,
the procedure and duration of the stops at issue were not different
than the stops at roadblocks upheld in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte. All
of the stops lasted a few minutes, and the scope of the intrusion was
nearly identical-the only difference here was the introduction of the
sniffing dog, but as discussed, that element did not alter the scope or
nature of the intrusion.241
Applying this test, the Court should have upheld the drug inter-
diction checkpoints. However, rather than following the principles
set forth in previous roadblock cases, the Court introduced a new cri-
teria-the Court thus found the roadblocks at issue to be unconstitu-
tional because of their primary purpose.2 42
C. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST THE COURT INTRODUCED, WHILE
CLAIMING TO AFFORD GREATER FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION, IS NOT FOUNDED IN PRIOR CASE LAW OR IN THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The majority of the Court held that "[b]ecause the primary pur-
pose of the Indianapolis checkpoint is ultimately indistinguishable
from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints violate the
Fourth Amendment." '243 The Court repeated this principle multiple
times throughout its opinion, indicating without ambiguity that this
principle is the basis of the holding-general crime control is not a
valid state interest justifying the intrusion imposed on motorists by
the roadblocks here.244
The Court maintained that the primary purpose here is general
crime control, despite the City's insistence that the checkpoints have
other valid purposes-eradicating drunk driving and verifying li-
censes and registration.2 45 The Court engaged in a purpose inquiry,
attempting to climb inside the minds of the legislators and determine
exactly what state interest was most important to them in establishing
this program. The Court found that checkpoints should be judged
solely by their primary purpose rather than other valid secondary
purposes.246  But nearly half of the arrests that occurred at these
240 Brown, 443 U.S. at 51.
241 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35, 40.
242 Id. at 40-41,48.
243 Id. at 48.
244 Id. at 41-44, 48.
245 Id. at 46.
246 Id. at 46-47.
2002]
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
checkpoints were for these secondary purposes, indicating that the
City was indeed actively pursuing legitimate interests that have been
upheld as constitutionally permissible. 47 The Court did not attempt
to explain that while pursuing a state interest in preventing drunk
driving is acceptable, and pursuing another state interest in verifying
licenses is also acceptable, introducing a third state interest in pre-
venting drug trafficking suddenly transforms the checkpoint into an
attempt at "general crime control." Authorities in Indianapolis are
not looking for burglars or robbers or murderers. Rather, they are
simply utilizing the constitutionally permissible tool of roadblocks to
address several valid state interests simultaneously.
The Court's decision that sobriety checkpoints and license veri-
fication checkpoints are permissible but drug interdiction checkpoints
are unconstitutional seems illogical, because the difference between
sobriety checkpoints and drug interdiction checkpoints is unclear. In
fact, in considering the state interests that the Court has upheld as
valid justifications for operating roadblocks (preventing importation
of illegal aliens, verifying licenses and vehicle registrations, and
curbing drunk driving), it is unclear why interdicting illegal narcotics
is a less compelling or important state interest.248
The majority of the Court indicated that the roadblocks that were
upheld in Sitz and impliedly permissible in Prouse bore a "close con-
nection to roadway safety," '249 and the roadblocks in Martinez-Fuerte
were justifiable because of the strong federal interest in preventing
the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States.25° But it can be
argued that driving while under the influence of narcotics also poses
a threat to roadway safety. In addition, logic would suggest that
stopping the flow of deadly and addictive substances throughout In-
dianapolis is at least as important an interest as preventing the flow of
harmless illegal immigrants into California.
Rehnquist's dissent suggested another way to look at the issue-
the Court need not evaluate the legitimacy of the drug interdiction
purpose at all, because "once the constitutional requirements for a
particular seizure are satisfied, the subjective expectations of those
responsible for it, be it police officers or members of a city council,
are irrelevant.""25  Pursuing the state interests of eradicating drunk
247 Id. at 35.
248 RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 506 (2001).
249 Edmond, 531 U.S. at43.
250 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976).
251 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
[Vol. 93
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS v. EDMOND
driving and verifying licenses and registration make the Indianapolis
checkpoint constitutional-the fact that officers also hoped to find
drugs is irrelevant.252
But under the Court's new primary purpose test, the checkpoints
fail. Strangely, however, the Court's decision does not invalidate any
type of roadblock that has a secondary purpose of interdicting drugs.
In a footnote, O'Connor expressed the limits of the Court's holding.
Because the primary purpose here is drug interdiction, she main-
tained, the Court
need not decide whether the State may establish a checkpoint program with the
primary purpose of checking licenses or driver sobriety and a secondary purpose of
interdicting narcotics. Specifically, [the Court] express[ed] no view of the question
whether police may expand the scope of a license or sobriety checkpoint seizure in
order to detect the presence of drugs in a stopped car.
25 3
It appears, therefore, that states could circumvent this decision
easily. If the primary purpose here was not drug detection but pre-
vention of drunk driving, perhaps the roadblocks would have been
upheld. O'Connor's ambiguity and evasiveness in her footnote sug-
gest they would be. O'Connor insisted that these roadblocks must
fail because drug interdiction was their primary purpose, so it follows
that if drug interdiction was something other than the roadblock's
primary purpose, the roadblocks would be acceptable.254 In addition,
O'Connor's recognition that the introduction of a narcotics detection
dog does not affect the constitutionality of the roadblocks may have
opened the door to a slightly modified version of the roadblocks at
issue here.255
Thus, the lesson to legislators is that they should carefully draft
legislation involving roadblocks so that the primary purpose is one
that is recognized as constitutionally permissible. Unfortunately, this
outcome will likely have two effects-increased litigation over what
exactly the primary purpose of a given roadblock is and a realization
that the apparent promise of expanded Fourth Amendment protection
is illusory and hollow. A checkpoint identical to those in Indianapo-
lis could be upheld as consistent with this decision if legislators sim-
ply label it differently.
In fact, cases decided since the Supreme Court's decision in City
252 Id. at 51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
253 Id. at 47 n.2.




of Indianapolis v. Edmond suggest that lower courts are willing to
uphold certain drug interdiction measures as constitutional despite the
Court's decision here. In United States v. Machuca-Barrera,256 the
Fifth Circuit considered a search of the defendant's vehicle at an im-
migration checkpoint in Texas. In the course of the cursory search
for illegal immigrants, the officers obtained consent for a more intru-
sive search and subsequently discovered forty-three pounds of mari-
juana.257 The Fifth Circuit noted that drug interdiction checkpoints
are unconstitutional, but held that the search for narcotics here did not
violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment right because it occurred
in the context of a search at an immigration checkpoint, where drug
interdiction was not a primary purpose.258 In other instances, courts
have upheld drug interdiction measures as long as other purposes also
motivated officers' behavior.5 9
In sum, the primary purpose test is not grounded in the Fourth
Amendment and contradicts precedent (which in fact suggest that
courts should avoid probing the subjective intent of law enforcement
officers). In addition, the City of Indianapolis may have conceded
that the primary purpose of their checkpoints was drug interdiction, 60
but the arrest rate indicates that the other purposes (upheld as consti-
tutional in previous cases) were also actively pursued. Under this
new primary purpose test, that fact is immaterial. Finally, the pri-
mary purpose test is empty because it does not preclude the creation
of checkpoints identical to the type struck down here. Rather, it sug-
gests that legislatures should simply be more careful when drafting
legislation creating those checkpoints.
VI. CONCLUSION
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court adopted reasoning
different from its previous analyses of roadblock cases. Rather than
applying the Brown v. Texas balancing test to determine whether the
City had a significant interest that outweighed the intrusion imposed
on motorists, the Court developed a new primary purpose test. This
256 States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 429-30 (5th Cir. 2001).
257 Id. at 429-30.
258 Id. at 435.
259 See United States v. Davis, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1305-06 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (upheld
a roadblock constructed with the primary purpose of detaining six persons indicted on drug
offenses and found that no constitutional violation occurred when a third party was detained
and drugs discovered in the course of a search of his vehicle).
260 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35, 40-41 (2000).
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novel approach was not grounded in previous case law or in the
Fourth Amendment itself Although the Court justified its decision
as protection of Fourth Amendment rights, the decision will not have
that effect. Rather, the Court has simply made the constitutionality of
roadblocks more confusing. Lower courts must now inquire into the
primary purpose (and hence, the subjective intent) of the state in im-
plementing these programs. As a result, states can circumvent the
decision simply by carefully wording their legislation and articulating
permissible primary purposes. The Court's promise of greater Fourth
Amendment protection is thus illusory, as the same types of seizures
might be upheld if they are conducted in a program with a different
stated primary purpose. Challenges to roadblock cases will certainly
increase, and lower courts have been left with little clear guidance
about how to approach them and how to evaluate the constitutionality
of roadblocks under the Fourth Amendment.
Ann Mulligan
2002]
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